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Abstract. We study envy-free pricing mechanisms in matching markets with m items and n bud-
get constrained buyers. Each buyer is interested in a subset of the items on sale, and she appraises
at some single-value every item in her preference-set. Moreover, each buyer has a budget that con-
straints the maximum affordable payment, while she aims to obtain as many items as possible of her
preference-set. Our goal is to compute an envy-free pricing allocation that maximizes the revenue, i.e.,
the total payment charged to the buyers. This pricing problem is hard to approximate better than
Ω(min{n,m}1/2−ǫ) for any ǫ > 0, unless P = NP [11]. The hardness result is due to the presence of
the matching constraints given that the simpler multi-unit case can be approximated up to a constant
factor of 2 [14]. The goal of this paper is to circumvent the hardness result by restricting ourselves to
specific settings of valuations and budgets. Two particularly significant scenarios are: each buyer has a
budget that is greater than her single-value valuation, and each buyer has a budget that is lower than
her single-value valuation. Surprisingly, in both scenarios we are able to achieve a 1/4-approximation to
the optimal envy-free revenue. The algorithms utilize a novel version of the Ausebel [1] ascending price
auction. These results may suggest that, although it is difficult to approximate the optimal revenue in
general, ascending price auctions could achieve relatively good revenue in most of the practical settings.
1 Introduction
In this paper we study revenue maximization with envy-free pricing in matching markets. Imagine a
seller that would like to sell m different items to n buyers. Every buyer i is interested in a subset of
items Si (the preference-set) and has a budget bi that represents her maximum affordable payment.
Moreover, every buyer i appraises each item in her preference-set at value vi, and any other item
has zero-value for her. The buyers are willing to get the largest number of items in their preference-
sets. But every buyer i doesn’t want to pay more than her value vi for an item and more than her
budget bi for the whole set of obtained items.
The seller has full knowledge on the buyer types and aims to compute an outcome that maxi-
mizes her revenue. The outcome is composed by a payment vector (a payment pi for each buyer i)
and an allocation vector (a, potentially empty, set of items Xi for each buyer i).
Every buyer i, given a payment pi and an allocation Xi, has a utility equal to vi · |Xi ∩ Si| − pi
if the payment is less than or equal to the budget, i.e. pi ≤ bi. However, the utility becomes −∞ if
the payment exceeds the budget, i.e. pi > bi.
Our goal is to design a pricing algorithm that is able to provide a good revenue to the seller and
observe some fairness criterion for the buyers. In order to model fairness, we consider two notions:
(i) the individual rationality, and (ii) the envy-freeness. Individual rationality means that at the
end of the auction no buyer will experience a negative utility. Envy-freeness means that, given a
pricing scheme (an assignment of prices to items or sets of items), every buyer obtains the most
desired set of items.
Different notions of envy-freeness have been studied in literature, and a detailed discussion
about them is deferred to Section 1.2. In classical economics, the standard envy-free definition
⋆ This work is partly supported by the EU FET project MULTIPLEX no. 317532 and the Google Focused Award
on “Algorithms for Large-scale Data Analysis”.
embodies bundle pricing [16,23]. In the bundle pricing scheme each (different) set of items has a
(potentially) different price. Thus in a bundle-price envy-free allocation no buyer has an incentive
to barter her bundle with the bundle of someone else.
More recently, envy-freeness has been often studied in the more restrictive setting of item
pricing [3,5,6,8,19,12]. In an item pricing scheme each (different) item has a (potentially) different
price. Thus, the price for a bundle is obtained by summing the single items’ prices contained in it.
Consequently, in item-price envy-free allocations every buyer receives the bundle that maximizes
her own utility.
The difference is that the former definition of envy-freeness allows a buyer to envy only bundles
that are assigned to someone else. Instead, the latter definition allows a buyer to be envious if
the obtained bundle is not the utility-maximizer bundle (even if the utility-maximizer bundle is
not allocated at all). In this paper we will use both definitions, and we will explicitly state which
envy-free condition is satisfied for each provided algorithm. All our algorithms use as benchmark
the optimal bundle-price envy-free revenue.3
The envy-free revenue-maximization problem with budget constraints has been initially studied
by Feldman et al. [14] in the multi-unit setting that considers one single kind of items (no matching
constraints). The authors discussed the limitations of the different pricing schemes, specifically
they showed through separation examples that an item-pricing scheme cannot achieve more than
O(1/m) fraction of the optimal envy-free bundle-price revenue on some specific example. Thus,
relying on a bundle pricing scheme, they provided a 2-approximation algorithm to the optimal
envy-free bundle-price revenue for multi-unit setting with budgeted buyers.
More recently, Branzei et al. [4] studied the same multi-unit setting in the context of item-
pricing scheme, and they gave an FPTAS for the optimal envy-free item-price revenue (and an
exact algorithm for special cases) using an item-pricing scheme.
The envy-free revenue-maximization problem in matching markets with budget constraints has
been considered for the first time in Colini-Baldeschi et. al. [11]. They proved that for n buyers
and m items, the optimal revenue cannot be approximated by a polynomial time algorithm within
Ω(min{n,m}1/2−ǫ) for any ǫ > 0, unless P = NP . In this paper we present a novel approach that
allows us to circumvent the Ω(min{n,m}1/2−ǫ) impossibility result for practically relevant special
cases.
1.1 Our results
We first consider the case where every buyer has a budget that is greater than or equal to her
valuation. For example, in online advertising, it is typical that the advertisers’ budgets are greater
than their CPM valuations for a block of impressions, and the advertisers are interested in buying
multiple blocks of impressions from different publishers. Second, complementary to the first case,
we study the case where every buyer has a budget that is less than her valuation.
In the two cases we are able to provide:
– an individually-rational and item-price envy-free algorithm that achieves a 4-approximation to
the optimal bundle-price envy-free revenue, when bi ≥ vi for every buyer i, and
– an individually-rational and bundle-price envy-free algorithm that achieves a 4-approximation
to the optimal bundle-price envy-free revenue, when bi < vi for every buyer i.
The key ingredient needed to achieve these results is the design of an ascending price auction
(inspired by the Ausubel auction [1]) for the matching market setting. Our implementation adopts
3 A bundle pricing scheme is able to extract more revenue than an item pricing scheme. Thus, competing against
the optimal bundle-price envy-free revenue is the hardest task in this context. See Section 1.2.
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the standard ascending price auction’s lifecycle: (i) the price is raised until some condition is
met (usually referred as selling condition), (ii) when the selling condition is met an appropriate
selling procedure is executed, and the auction goes back to (i). The main novelty introduced in our
implementation is about the selling procedure. The idea is to use proper arguments from matching
theory (B-matchings and their properties) to compute an envy-free allocation of items to buyers.
Besides envy-freeness we are interested to secure the fairest pricing scheme to the buyers. The
fixed-price scheme (one single price for all the items) is the standard way to achieve fairness in setting
with identical items. But, as expected, in setting with different items (like matching markets) a
fixed-price scheme cannot obtain more than a logarithmic fraction of the optimal revenue regardless
of computational complexity considerations (see Appendix F).
Thus different prices for different items is a strict requirement to achieve a constant approxi-
mation. Nonetheless our aim is still to diversify the prices of the items as little as possible to avoid
discrimination among buyers.
In the first case (bi ≥ vi), if a buyer obtains some items, then every item she obtained is charged
at the same price, and all the buyers that desire one of that items (and are able to pay for them)
obtain other items at the same price. Intuitively, the idea is to partition the initial market in many
submarkets and apply a fixed-price scheme in each of them.
Unfortunately, the same approach cannot be used in the second case (bi < vi). Here it is
necessary to adopt a bundle-pricing scheme. Namely, it is possible that different items are assigned
at different prices to the same buyer, but for each price every buyer obtains the best bundle among
the bundles assigned at the same price. A bundle-pricing scheme is a strict requirement to obtain
a constant approximation, indeed in Feldman et al. [14] a separation example showed that with an
item-pricing scheme it is not possible to achieve an approximation factor better than m (number
of items) to the optimal envy-free revenue.4
Since the ascending price auction approach can be adapted in either special cases. We conclude
that the general inapproximability result of this problem provided in Colini-Baldeschi et. al. [11] is
the result of the interaction between the above mentioned buyer classes.
1.2 Related work
Envy-free pricing. The notion of envy-freeness was initially introduced by Foley [16] and Varian [23].
The key property of an envy-free allocation is that no buyer has incentive to exchange her bundle-
payment pair with the bundle-payment pair of another buyer. That is to say, given a set of bundles
and the corresponding prices, every buyer obtains the bundle that maximizes her utility. This
definition became the standard definition in the economics literature. More recently, the notion of
envy-freeness has been deeply studied with a different perspective that involves item-pricing instead
of bundle-pricing. Indeed the key property of an envy-free allocation has been reshaped as follows:
given a set of items and the corresponding (per-item) prices, every buyer obtains the bundle that
maximizes her utility. Notice that the price of a bundle is automatically obtained from the sum of
the items’ prices contained in it. It is easy to see that this definition is more difficult to satisfy than
the classical economics definition. The item-pricing version of envy-freeness has been considered in
[3,5,6,8,19,12].
The envy-freeness was studied in the context of different pricing schemes by Feldman et al. [14].
Specifically, they focused they attention on: (i) the bundle-pricing scheme, where it is possible to
4 We remark that the separation example can be easily translated in an instance of the case in which every buyer
i has bi < vi. Instead, in the first case, when every buyer i has bi ≥ vi, the separation example fails. Indeed, in
that case we are able to provide an item pricing scheme that obtains a constant approximation to the optimal
bundle-price envy-free revenue.
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specify different prices for different bundles, (ii) the item-pricing scheme, where different prices
can be assigned to different items, and (iii) proportional-pricing scheme, that embody an item-
pricing scheme plus the possibility to specify a maximum or a minimum size on the bundles that
can be demanded by the buyers. Moreover, the authors were able to rank these pricing schemes
with respect to two distinct criteria: the customer experience (how much the customers judge
fair a pricing scheme) or the obtainable revenue (how much a pricing scheme is able to extract
from the customers). In terms of customer experience the most desired pricing scheme is the item-
pricing scheme, then the proportional-pricing scheme, and finally the bundle-pricing scheme. This
is because the customers prefer the pricing schemes that allow less discrimination and are more
uniform (uniformity is perceived as fairness). As expected, on the revenue perspective the ranking
is reversed: the bundle-pricing scheme is able to produce the highest revenue, then proportional-
pricing scheme is able to extract something less, and then the item-pricing scheme is the scheme
that is able to extract less. Feldman et al. [14] have shown several separation examples that clearly
state the limits of the different pricing schemes.
In our paper we aim to design algorithms that embody the fairest pricing scheme and compete
against the powerful optimum. That is, we aim to design item-pricing algorithms that obtain a
constant approximation to the optimal bundle-pricing envy-free revenue. When the item-pricing
scheme fails to obtain a constant approximation, then we embody a proportional-pricing (or bundle-
pricing) scheme.
Revenue-maximization. Moreover, Feldman et al. [14] proved that the problem of computing
an optimal bundle-pricing envy-free revenue is NP-hard. Thus, they provided a 2-approximation
algorithm for multi-unit setting with budget constraints, it is also proved that this result is tight.
Colini-Baldeschi et al. [11] investigated the problem in the context of multi-unit fixed-price auctions
with budget constraints and matching markets with budget constraints. Particularly relevant for
our paper is the hardness result presented there. Indeed, they proved that the revenue maximizing
envy-free problem in matching markets is Ω(min{n,m}1/2−ǫ) inapproximable for any ǫ > 0, unless
P = NP . This is why we are forced to study (particularly relevant) special cases. The envy-
free revenue maximization problem in multi-unit setting with budgets is also studied in [4]. They
provided algorithms that approximate optimal social welfare and optimal revenue with an item-
pricing scheme when buyers are price takers, and an impossibility result for price making buyers.
The main difference between [11] and [4] is that the former considered bundle-pricing envy-freeness
(pairwise envy-freeness), while the latter focused on the definition of item-pricing envy-freeness.
Recently, the item-pricing envy-free problem for general valuations in multi-unit markets without
budgets is considered in [21], and a dynamic programming algorithm is provided in such setting.
Moreover, Chen and Deng [7] provide hardness results for unit-demand buyers in the multi-unit
markets without budgets setting.
Mechanisms with budgets. Dobzinski et al. [13] provided a Pareto-optimal and incentive compat-
ible mechanisms in multi-unit settings (i.e., multiple copies of the same items). Similar results are
obtained in [15] where buyers have different preference sets. No incentive-compatible mechanism
is fully efficient when buyers have budgets: only Pareto-optimality can be achieved. Moreover, it
is crucial to assume that budgets and preferences are public knowledge for the design of incentive
compatible, Pareto-optimal mechanisms. If we insist on incentive compatible and Pareto-optimal
mechanisms, no envy-free efficient allocation is possible. Feldman et al. [14] observed that existing
mechanisms also sell identical items at different prices, e.g., the VCG mechanism for buyers with
unlimited budget [9,18,24], or the ascending price auction for buyers with budgets [13,22].
Ascending price auctions. Ascending price auctions were used in FCC spectrum auctions and
were initially studied in [1,2,20]. Later, ascending price auctions were widely applied in the context
of sponsored search auctions. Dobzinski et al.[13] designed a Pareto-optimal, incentive compatible
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ascending price auction for a multi-unit setting when buyers have budget constraints. Numerous
subsequent papers extended this setting, see [10,15,17].
2 Preliminaries
An instance of the revenue-maximizing envy-free pricing problem in matching markets can be
formally depicted by the tuple A = 〈I, J,S,v,b〉. There is a set of |I| = n buyers and a set of
|J | = m different items in the market. Every buyer i ∈ I is interested in a set of items Si ⊆ J ,
which we refer as the preference-set of buyer i. Buyers equally value the items in their preference-
sets. Specifically, every buyer i has a valuation vi ∈ R>0 for each item j ∈ Si and has a valuation
of zero for any item j /∈ Si. Every buyer i has a budget bi ∈ R≥0 that is the maximum payment
she can afford.
An algorithm computes an outcome 〈X,p〉 for every possible instanceA, whereX = 〈X1, . . . ,Xn〉
is the allocation vector, and p = 〈p1, . . . , pn〉 is the payment vector. That is, for each buyer i, Xi ⊆ J
is the set of items allocated to buyer i, and pi ∈ R≥0 is the payment charged to buyer i. Moreover,
we use p¯i to denote the per-item-price paid by a buyer i, i.e., p¯i =
pi
|Xi|
. Given an allocation Xi and
a payment pi, the utility of a buyer i is defined as
ui(Xi, pi) =
{
vi · |Xi ∩ Si| − pi if bi ≥ pi
−∞ if bi < pi
In addition, a feasible outcome 〈X,p〉 must satisfy the following constraints:
– feasibility (or supply constraint): for any pair of buyers i, i′ ∈ I, Xi ∩Xi′ = ∅;
– individual rationality : for any buyer i ∈ I, ui(Xi, pi) ≥ 0.
Furthermore, we incline toward our algorithm to produce envy-free outcomes. An outcome
〈X,p〉 is:
– envy-free: if given an item-pricing vector ρ = {ρ1, . . . , ρm} such that the price for the item j is
ρj . Then pi =
∑
j∈Xi
ρj, and there is no bundle X
′ ⊆ J such that ui(X
′,
∑
j∈X′ ρj) > ui(Xi, pi).
And,
– pairwise envy-free: if given a set of proposed bundles X such that: every bundle Xi ∈ X has
a corresponding price pi ∈ p, and every bundle X
′ 6∈ X has price equal to ∞. Then for every
buyer i and every bundle Xj ∈ X, buyer i prefers her own bundle, i.e., ui(Xi, pi) ≥ ui(Xj , pj).
Given outcome 〈X,p〉, the revenue (i.e., the revenue of the algorithm on instance A) is the sum
of the payments of all buyers, i.e., R(X,p) =
∑
i∈I pi. Our goal is to design an envy-free algorithm
that approximates the optimal envy-free revenue for every possible instance A.
2.1 Ascending price auction
Our technique to design revenue-maximizing envy-free algorithms relies on the implementation of
an ascending price auction. The standard implementation of an ascending price auction is as follows:
(i) the price (initialized at zero) is raised until some condition is met (usually referred as selling
condition), (ii) when the selling condition is met an appropriate selling procedure is executed, and
the auction goes back to (i) (if there is at least one buyer with positive demand). The novelty of
the ascending price auction described in this paper is about the selling procedure. We will give a
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detailed description of the selling procedures in Section 3 and Section 4, but in either cases the
selling procedure relies on the graph representation of the problems and their properties.
To facilitate our future presentation and analysis, here we introduce some necessary notations.
For a price p, the demand of buyer i is defined as follows:
Di(p) =
{
min{⌊ bip ⌋, |Si|}, if p ≤ vi
0, if p > vi
(2.1)
Intuitively, Di(p) is the number of the items that maximizes the utility of buyer i if all items
in Si are priced at p.
Given price p, we define three sets of buyers Ap, Qp, and Ip. Ap contains the buyers whose
valuations are strictly greater than p and having positive demands, i.e., Ap = {i ∈ I|vi > p∧Di(p) >
0}. Qp contains the buyers whose valuations are equal to p and having positive demands, i.e.,
Qp = {i ∈ I|vi = p ∧Di(p) > 0}. Finally, let I
p be the union of Ap and Qp, i.e., Ip = Ap ∪Qp.
2.2 Graph representation
Matching markets have a very intuitive bipartite graph representation. Consider a set of buyers
I ′ ⊆ I and a set of items J ′ ⊆ J as two disjoint sets of nodes in a bipartite graph. Given a
price p, there exists an edge between i ∈ I ′ and j ∈ J ′ if buyer i demands item j at price p, i.e.,
(j ∈ Si) ∧ (bi ≥ p) ∧ (p ≤ vi). More specifically, taking the notations established above, given a
particular price p and a subset of items J ′ ⊆ J , we define a bipartite graph Gp = (Ip ∪ J ′, Ep),
where Ep = {(i, j)|i ∈ Ip, j ∈ J ′ ∩ Si}. Similarly, we define G¯
p = (Ap ∪ J ′, E¯p) as the bipartite
graph that only includes buyers in Ap. In this paper we refer to Gp and G¯p as preference-graphs.
Additionally, allocations in matching markets can be seen as matchings in preference-graphs,
because an allocation essentially “maps” buyers to a subset of items. To formalize this idea, we
introduce the concept of B-matching.
Definition 2.1. Given a bipartite graph Gp = (Ip ∪ J ′, Ep), a B-matching M(Gp) is a sub-graph
of Gp such that every buyer is not matched to a number of items greater than her demand, i.e.,
∀i ∈ IP , |{j ∈ J ′ : (i, j) ∈ M(Gp)}| ≤ Di(p), and every item is not matched to more than one
buyer, i.e., ∀j ∈ Jp, |{i ∈ Ip : (i, j) ∈M(Gp)}| ≤ 1.
Similarly, we useM(G¯p) to denote the B-matching on graph G¯p. From now on, we will simply write
matchings instead of B-matchings, and the notation M(Gp) will refer to a maximum matching on
Gp. Given a matching, an allocation can be easily constructed. For example, if edge (i, j) is in
the matching, then item j is allocated to buyer i. By the matching’s definition, the allocations
constructed from the matchings would satisfy the supply constraint and the budget constraint.
Finally, we introduce the concept of augmenting path. Given a preference-graph, an augmenting
path starts with a buyer and ends with an unallocated item in the preference-graphs. We mainly use
augmenting paths to produce envy-free outcomes. Intuitively, to achieve the envy-freeness, given a
matching at price p, if a buyer obtains an item then every buyer in Ap, who is connected to that
item by an augmenting path, will also obtain the items in their preference sets at price p.
Definition 2.2. Given a B-matching M(Gp) (resp. M(G¯p)), an augmenting path π between buyer
i and item j is a path π = {i = y1, z1, y2, z2, . . . , yh, zh = j} such that the following conditions hold:
1. ∀k ∈ [1, . . . , h], yk is a buyer. That is, yk ∈ I
p(resp. yk ∈ A
p).
2. ∀k ∈ [1, . . . , h], zk is an item. That is, zk ∈ J
′.
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3. ∀k ∈ [1, . . . , h], zk ∈ Syk and (yk, zk) /∈ M(G
p) (resp. (yk, zk) /∈ M(G¯
p)).
4. ∀k ∈ [1, . . . , h− 1], (zk, yk+1) ∈ M(G
p) (resp. (zk, yk+1) ∈ M(G¯
p)).
In an augmenting path defined above, if item zh is allocated to a buyer i /∈ {y1, . . . , yh} at price
p, we will also allocate some item to every buyer in {y1, . . . , yh}. We use this technique to achieve
the envy-freeness among buyers.
3 An ascending price algorithm for bi ≥ vi
In this section we present an algorithm that obtains a 4-approximation to the optimal bundle-price
envy-free revenue when all buyers have budgets that are equal to or greater than their valuations,
i.e., ∀i ∈ I, bi ≥ vi. We remark that this is an item pricing algorithm, and it achieves a constant
approximation with respect to the optimal bundle-price envy-free revenue.
The general idea is to implement an ascending price auction with selling conditions and selling
procedures accurately designed to take advantage of this scenario. The implementation of the
ascending price auction is described in Algorithm 1. At the beginning the price is set to zero.
Then the algorithm increases the price until a proper selling condition is satisfied (line 4). When
the selling condition is matched, the algorithm executes a selling procedure and assigns items
and payments to the involved buyers. Notice that in Algorithm 1 there are two different selling
procedures: Compute-Allocation-I described by Algorithm 2, and Compute-Allocation-II
described by Algorithm 3. The selling condition and the two selling procedures will be described
in the next subsections.
3.1 Selling condition and critical prices
Algorithm 1 uses a selling condition to catch the correct price at which a selling procedure can be
executed. Intuitively, the notion of correct price relies on the following abstraction: nothing can be
sold if the buyers’ cumulative demand is too high (the sum of the buyers’ demands is greater than
the available items). But quantifying if buyers’ cumulative demand is too high is not a trivial task
for two main reasons: (i) in a matching markets setting the demand can be too high on a particular
set of items but too low on a different set, and (ii) the demand functions are not continuous, thus
we can have a cumulative demand that is too high at p and too low at p+ ǫ.
So, we want to detect each price p that is borderline between a too high and a too low cumulative
demand. These prices are called critical prices. To detect critical prices, we have to compute two
maximum matchings for each price p: a maximum matching at price p and a maximum matching
at price p + ǫ. If the size of the maximum matching at p is greater than the size of the maximum
matching at p+ ǫ, then we know that on some set of items the cumulative demand will be too low
at any price higher than p. So, we have to check if something should be sold at p.
To be more formal, we define the set of critical prices as follows:
Definition 3.1. Given a price p, let Gp = (Ip ∪ J ′, Ep) where J ′ ⊆ J is the set of unsold items.
The price p is critical if |M(Gp)| > |M(Gp+ǫ)|, where M(Gp) and M(Gp+ǫ) are the maximum
matchings in Gp and Gp+ǫ, respectively.
Notice that the selling condition at line 4 of Algorithm 1 is satisfied for each critical price.
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3.2 Detailed Description and Selling Procedures
For each critical price p, Algorithm 1 performs the following actions:
– The algorithm checks if price p is critical because the demand of some buyer in Qp goes to zero
when the price is increased above p (line 5). In this case, Procedure Compute-Allocation-I
computes an envy-free partial assignment, where every item is sold at p.
– The other reason of price p being a critical price is that some buyer in Ap cannot afford the
same amount of items at a slightly higher price (for budget limitations). In this case, Procedure
Compute-Allocation-II computes an envy-free partial assignment, where every item is sold
at p+ ǫ.
In either procedures the key element is the computation of an envy-free partial assignment.
In order to describe how an envy-free partial assignment is computed, we introduce some further
notation. Given a graph Gp = (Ip ∪ J ′, Ep), a maximum matching M(Gp) on Gp, and a subset of
items J ′ ⊆ J , we denote with J¯ ⊆ J ′ the set of items that are not matched in M(Gp), and with
N(J¯) ⊆ Ip the set of buyers that are connected with an augmenting path in M(Gp) to some item
in J¯ . Now, an envy-free partial assignment is computed as follows:
1. a maximum matching M(Gp) on the graph Gp = (Ip ∪ J,Ep) is computed,
2. let J¯ ⊆ J ′ be the subset of items that are not matched in M(Gp),
3. the envy-free partial assignment m is the subgraph ofM(Gp) that involves only buyers in N(J¯).
Restrict the allocation to the buyers in N(J¯) is the key to obtain envy-freeness and a good
revenue in a partial assignment. Indeed, we claim that if a buyer i is connected with an augmenting
path to an item j, but that item j remains unmatched in a maximum matching, then the buyer
i obtains as many items as she demands. Intuitively, this is enough to extract a good revenue
(allocating full demand we extract almost the whole budget), and to achieve an envy-free allocation
(if a buyer receives her full demand, then she is happy).
The next paragraphs will discuss the details of the two procedures. Procedure Compute-
Allocation-I and Procedure Compute-Allocation-II implement the computation of envy-free
partial assignment with different details, but the two procedures are similar in spirit.
Compute-Allocation-I Algorithm 2 is executed when the price becomes equal to the valuation
of some buyer, and it is not possible to sell the same amount of items at a slightly higher price.
Notice that these buyers belong to the set Qp. Moreover, recall that, by definition of envy-freeness,
every buyer in Qp cannot envy any other buyer that obtains items at price p. Let us denote with
JpQ the set of available items in the preference sets of buyers in Q
p. Thus, the general idea is to
compute an envy-free partial assignment such that most of the items in JpQ are assigned to the
buyers in Ap. In succession, the items that remain unmatched will be assigned to the buyers in Qp.
To achieve this, the algorithm computes a maximum matchingM(G¯p) with the minimal number
of items in JpQ matched (line 3 in Algorithm 2). This can be done using the technique of weighted
matching. In order to allocate the remaining items to buyers in Qp and preserve the envy-freeness
of the outcome, the algorithm first allocates items to buyers in Ap who have augmenting paths to
any remaining item in M(G¯p). Essentially, if an item is allocated to a buyer in Qp at price p, every
buyer i in Ap who is connected to the item by an augmenting path obtains ⌊ bip ⌋ items and pays
p · ⌊ bip ⌋. Thus, buyer i will not envy the buyers in Q
p.
Every envy-free partial assignmentM ⊆M(G¯p) computed by procedureCompute-Allocation-
I satisfies two important properties: (i) every buyer i ∈M receives an amount of items exactly equal
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Algorithm 1 An ascending price algorithm for matching markets when bi ≥ vi
Input: < I, J,S,v,b >
Output: 〈X,p〉
1: p← 0; /*p is the uniform price for all items and it is dynamically increasing*/
2: Gp = (Ip ∪ J,Ep); /*Gp is the preference-graph for unsold items at price p */
3: while |M(Gp)| 6= ∅ do
4: Increase p until |M(Gp)| > |M(Gp+ǫ)|;
5: if |M(Gp)| > |M(G¯p)| then
6: M←Compute-Allocation-I(I, J,S,v,b, p);
7: for each edge (i, j) ∈ M do
8: J = J \ {j}, Xi = Xi ∪ {j}, pi = pi + p, bi = bi − p;
9: end for
10: else
11: M←Compute-Allocation-II(I, J,S,v,b, p);
12: for each edge (i, j) ∈ M do
13: J = J \ {j}, Xi = Xi ∪ {j}, pi = pi + (p+ ǫ), bi = bi − (p+ ǫ);
14: end for
15: Remove all the items that are not demanded anymore.
16: end if
17: end while
to her demand, i.e., |{(i, j) ∈ M}| = Di(p) ∀i ∈ M, and (ii) every item that is not assigned at the
end of procedure Compute-Allocation-I is requested by at least one buyer after procedure
Compute-Allocation-I.
These properties are formally proved by the following lemmata.
Lemma 3.1. Let M(G¯p) be a maximum matching on graph G¯p and JpQ 6= ∅, then each buyer
i ∈ N(J¯) is matched to Di(p) items in M(G¯
p), where J¯ is the set of items not matched in M(G¯p).
Proof. Assume by contradiction that a buyer i ∈ N(J¯) gets less than Di(p) items. It implies that
buyer i is matched to less than Di(p) items inM(G¯
p), that is, |{(i, j) ∈ M(G¯p)|j ∈ J}| < Di(p). In
addition, buyer i is connected to an item in J¯ by an augmenting path. Therefore, one can assign one
more item from J¯ to buyers in Ap. It contradicts the fact that M(G¯p) is the maximum B-matching
that minimizes the the number of items matched in JpQ. ⊓⊔
Lemma 3.2. In Procedure Compute-Allocation-I, all items in J¯ can be allocated to the buyers
in Qp at price p per each.
Proof. J¯ contains the items that are matched in M(Gp) but not matched in M(G¯p). It implies
that any item in J¯ is in the preference-set of at least one buyer in Qp. Given that M(Gp) matches
all the items, it guarantees that all unmatched items in J¯ can be assigned to buyers in Qp. ⊓⊔
Compute-Allocation-II Algorithm 3 is executed when it is not possible to sell the same amount
of items at a slightly higher price, but no buyer in Qp is responsible for that. Notice that in this case,
the buyers that decrease their demands are in Ap. Namely, the buyers drop their demands because
budgets and not valuations. Thus, there are no buyers in Qp that are relevant for us. Consequently,
it is enough to compute an envy-free partial assignment at price p + ǫ. Similarly to the previous
case, to preserve the envy-freeness of the outcome, the algorithm allocates items to buyers in Ap
who have an augmenting path to an unmatched items in M(Gp+ǫ). Given the fact that all items
are matched inM(Gp), if an items is not matched to any buyer inM(Gp+ǫ), then it implies that all
buyers who have augmenting paths to this item must be fully matched inM(Gp+ǫ). In other words,
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Algorithm 2 Compute-Allocation-I
1: procedure Compute-Allocation-I(I, J,S,v,b, p)
2: Let JpQ be the set of items in the preference-sets of buyers in Q
p at price p, i.e. JpQ =
⋃
i∈Qp Si;
3: Compute a maximum B-matching M(G¯p) with minimum number of items in JpQ matched;
4: Let J¯ be the set of items that are not matched in M(G¯p);
5: Let N(J¯) be the set of buyers that are connected to an item in J¯ with an augmenting path in M(G¯p);
6: Let M = {(i, j) ∈ M(G¯p)|i ∈ N(J¯)};
7: Assign items in J¯ to buyers in Qp such that the allocation satisfies the supply constraint and budget constraint;
8: Include the assignment of J¯ to M;
9: return M
10: end procedure
those buyers do not have enough budgets to buy one more item. Otherwise, the size of M(Gp+ǫ)
can be increased. We prove this property in the following lemma (proof in Appendix A).
Algorithm 3 Compute-Allocation-II
1: procedure Compute-Allocation-II(I, J,S,v,b, p)
2: Compute a maximum B-matching M(Gp+ǫ);
3: Let J¯p+ǫ be the set of items that are not matched in M(Gp+ǫ);
4: Let N(J¯p+ǫ) be the set of buyers that are connected to an item J¯p+ǫ with an augmenting path;
5: Let M = {(i, j) ∈ M(Gp+ǫ)|i ∈ N(J¯p+ǫ)};
6: Remove items in J¯p+ǫ from J ;
7: return M
8: end procedure
Lemma 3.3. Let M(Gp+ǫ) be a maximum matching on graph Gp+ǫ, and let J¯p+ǫ 6= ∅ be the set
of items not matched in the maximum matching M(Gp+ǫ). Then for each buyers i ∈ N(J¯p+ǫ) the
followings hold: (i) vi > p, and (ii) buyer i is matched to Di(p + ǫ) items in M(G
p+ǫ).
Notice that at the end of the procedure it is possible that some items remain unassigned but
no buyer will demand them anymore. This is a potential problem for the revenue, because many
unassigned items can be translated in many not-extracted moneys. But, the next lemma shows that
the number of unassigned items is bounded (proof in Appendix B).
Lemma 3.4. Let M(Gp+ǫ) be a maximum matching on graph Gp+ǫ, and let J¯p+ǫ be the set of
items not matched in the maximum matching M(Gp+ǫ), then |J¯p+ǫ| ≤ |N(J¯p+ǫ)|.
3.3 Main result
Finally, we are ready to prove that the outcome computed by Algorithm 1 is envy-free and achieves
a 4-approximation to the optimal bundle-price envy-free revenue.
We start with some auxiliary lemmata:
Lemma 3.5. Let 〈X,p〉 be the outcome obtained by Algorithm 1. If Xi 6= ∅, the buyer i obtains all
the items in Xi at a unique price-per-item p¯i =
pi
|Xi|
.
The proof of Lemma 3.5 is in Appendix C. Then,
Lemma 3.6. If buyer i obtains Xi at price-per-item p¯i, then all the items assigned at a price
p′ < p¯i are not in her preference-set.
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Proof. Assume by contradiction that an item j ∈ Si is allocated at a price p
′ < p¯i. Then buyer i
has an augmenting path to j, and i ∈ Ap (since her valuation is at least equal to p¯i > p
′). Thus by
Lemma 3.3, we know that buyer i would have obtained all her items at price p′. Then, it concludes
that buyer i is not interested in any item allocated at lower prices. ⊓⊔
Lemma 3.7. If buyer i does not obtain any item, i.e., Xi = ∅, then all items in Si are sold at a
price greater than or equal to vi.
Proof. Observe that, since i does not obtain any item, she will have a positive demand since until
the price reaches her valuation. Assume by contradiction that an item j ∈ Si has been sold at a
price p < vi. Let i
′ be the buyer that obtains j at p. Then i is connected with an augmenting path
to j at p. But since j ∈ Si, Di(p) > 0, and i ∈ A
p, then by Lemma 3.3 the buyer i would have been
allocated at p as well. Contradiction. ⊓⊔
Now we show that Algorithm 1 is envy-free.
Theorem 3.1. The outcome 〈X,p〉 produced by Algorithm 1 is envy-free.
Proof. First, by Lemma 3.7, we know that the buyers that do not obtain any item do not envy
anyone. Furthermore, by Lemma 3.5, we know that, for the rest of buyers, they obtain all items in
Xi at a unique per-item-price p¯i =
pi
|Xi|
. The rest of the proof is divided into two cases.
1. p¯i = vi: The buyer i would not envy any buyer j that gets her bundle Xj at a price-per-item
p¯j ≥ p¯i. Moreover, by Lemma 3.6, buyer i is not interested in any item allocated at a price p < p¯i.
This implies that buyer i cannot envy any buyer j who obtains the bundle at price-per-item
p¯j ≤ p¯i.
2. p¯i < vi: Buyer i obtains Xi in either Compute-Allocation-I or Compute-Allocation-II.
In both cases, by Lemma 3.1 and 3.3, buyer i obtains Di(p¯i) = |Xi| items. Hence, buyer i does
not envy any buyer who obtains her bundle at price-per-item p ≥ p¯i. Moreover, by Lemma 3.6,
buyer i is not interested in any item allocated at a price p < p¯i. This implies that buyer i cannot
envy any buyer j who obtains the bundle at price-per-item p¯j ≤ p¯i.
Thus we conclude that Algorithm 1 is envy-free. ⊓⊔
Now, we show that the outcome computed by Algorithm 1 is a 4-approximation to the optimal
bundle-price envy-free revenue.
Theorem 3.2. Algorithm 1 achieves a 4−approximation to the optimal envy-free revenue when all
buyers have budgets that are at least their valuations.
Proof. Let us recall some intuition of Algorithm 1 first. For a given critical price p, Algorithm 1 per-
forms either Procedure Compute-Allocation-I or Compute-Allocation-II to allocate items
to buyers. In Compute-Allocation-I, some items are allocated to buyers that have valuations
equal to the critical price. Note that some buyers whose valuations are greater than the critical price
also obtain their items at the critical price if they are connected to those items. On the other hand,
in Compute-Allocation-II, items are only allocated to buyers that have valuations greater than
the critical price. Let us use INV L to denote the set of buyers who obtain items at prices lower than
their valuations, and IV L to denote the set of buyers who obtain items at prices that are equal to
their valuations. Finally, we use IUN to denote the set of buyers who obtain nothing at the end of
Algorithm 1. In the remainder of this proof we will use the following additional notation. Let us
denote with ROPT the optimal revenue, let ROPT
INV L
be the fraction of the optimal revenue obtained
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from the buyers in INV L, and let ROPTI be the fraction of the optimal revenue obtained from the
buyers in I, where I = IV L ∪ IUN . Obviously, ROPT = ROPT
INV L
+ROPTI . Moreover, let J
V L be the
set of items assigned to buyers in IV L at the end of Algorithm 1. Similarly, let JNV L be the set of
items assigned to buyers in INV L at the end of Algorithm 1. Given a set of items J ′ ⊆ J , R(J ′) is
the revenue that Algorithm 1 obtains from items in J ′.5
The first step is to bound the optimal revenue that can be extracted to buyers in INV L. Let
ROPT
INV L
be the revenue from buyers in INV L by any algorithm.
ROPTINV L ≤
∑
i∈INV L
bi
(a)
≤
∑
i∈INV L
p¯i(Di(p¯i) + 1)
(b)
≤ 2 ·
∑
i∈INV L
p¯iDi(p¯i) ≤ 2 · R(X,p)
where p¯i =
pi
|Xi|
is the price per item for buyer i. Inequality (a) is guaranteed by Lemma 3.1 and
3.3, which shows that, at a given price, if a buyer whose valuation is greater than the price and is
assigned to some items, then the buyers must be assigned to Di(p¯) items. The inequality (b) holds
because for each buyer i ∈ INV L we have that Di(p¯i) ≥ 1, since bi > vi.
The next step is to bound the optimal revenue that can be extracted from buyers in I. Different
from the previous case, as these buyers do not “exhuast” their budgets, we need a different approach
to bound their revenue. In particular, we bound the optimal revenue by considering the items in
their preference sets. Let P be the set of prices used by Algorithm 1 i.e. P = {p ∈ p}.
ROPTI
(a)
≤
∑
j∈
⋃
i∈I Si
max{vi|i ∈ I and j ∈ Si}
(b)
≤R(JV L) +R(JNV L ∩
⋃
i∈I
Si) +
∑
j∈
⋃
i∈I Si\{J
V L∪JNV L}
max{vi|i ∈ I and j ∈ Si}
(c)
≤R(JV L ∪ JNV L ∩
⋃
i∈I
Si) +
∑
p∈P
|N(Jp+ǫ)| · p
(d)
≤R(JV L ∪ JNV L ∩
⋃
i∈I
Si) +R(J
NV L) ≤ 2 · R(X,p)
Now let us explain the bound above step by step. Inequality (a) comes from the fact that the
optimal revenue is bounded by selling each item in their preference sets to the buyer with the highest
valuation. For each item, there are three possibilities in our algorithm. The first case is that the
item is sold to a buyer in I. In this case, that buyer must be the buyer with the highest valuation
among all buyers who are interested in this item in I. It is because if there are buyers who are also
interested in this item and have higher valuation, those buyers must be assigned to other items at
the same price (by the argument of augmenting path). Thus, these buyers are not belong to I. The
second case is that the item is sold to a buyer in INV L. In this case, the price of item is at least the
maximum valuation among all buyers who are interested in this item in IV L. The last case is the
item remain unsold by the end of Algorithm 1. It happens in Procedure Compute-Allocation-
II. For these items, we keep the same bound as before. By these arguments together, we obtain
Inequality (b). Next, Lemma 3.2 proved that after Procedure Compute-Allocation-I there are
not new unallocated items, and by Lemma 3.4 we know that the number of buyers allocated in
Procedure Compute-Allocation-II is greater than the number of unsold items. Moreover, for
5 All the new notation in this proof is only for the purpose of analysis.
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each of those buyers, their payments are at least the highest valuation among all buyers who are
interested in this item in I. Otherwise, similar as before, buyers who are also interested in this item
and have higher valuation must be assigned to other items at the same price (by the argument of
augmenting path). Thus, these buyers are not in I. Now we reach Inequality (c). Inequality (d) is
straightforward since each term is part of the revenue of Algorithm 1.
Putting all pieces we got so far together, we have
ROPT = ROPTINV L +R
OPT
I ≤ 4 · R(X,p)
⊓⊔
4 An ascending price algorithm for bi < vi
In this section we present an algorithm that obtains a 4-approximation to the optimal bundle-price
envy-free revenue in matching markets when all buyers have budgets less than their valuations, i.e.,
∀i ∈ I, bi < vi. The main difference with respect to the algorithm presented in Section 3 is about the
adopted pricing scheme. Due to a separation example showed in Feldman et al. [14], we know that
the optimal bundle-price envy-free revenue cannot be approximated within O( 1m) using an item
pricing scheme. Thus the algorithm presented in this section will embody a bundle pricing scheme,
and it will produce a pairwise envy-free outcome.6 Before the description of the algorithm, we
overload some notations. Given price p, let Ap contain the buyers whose budget are strictly greater
than p and having positive demands, i.e., Ap = {i ∈ I|bi > p∧Di(p) > 0}. Let Q
p contain the buyers
whose budgets are equal to p and having positive demands, i.e., Qp = {i ∈ I|bi = p ∧Di(p) > 0}.
Finally, let Ip be the union of Ap and Qp, i.e., Ip = Ap ∪Qp.
4.1 Detailed Description
The algorithm, which is referred to as Algorithm 4, shares the similar spirit as Algorithm 1 but
possesses some tweaks on the actions performed at critical prices. The algorithm starts with an
initial price p = 0 for all items and keeps increasing the price for all items until the price becomes
a critical price. The reason of a price being a critical price is a little different from the previous
case. Since vi > bi for all buyers, a price becomes a critical price when it is equal to the budget
of some buyer, or buyers cannot afford the same amount of items at higher prices. At each critical
price, the algorithm divides buyers in (N(J¯p) ∪Qp) into different partition (a partition is denoted
by Yt). One property of these partitions is that no buyers from different partitions have a common
item in their preference sets. It allows us to focus on each partition separately. Then the following
actions are performed on each partition.
– The algorithm compares the remaining budgets between buyers in (Yt ∩Q
p) \ Iˆ and buyers in
Yt ∩N(J¯
p) where Iˆ is the set of buyers who have obtained items at previous critical prices and
still have budgets to demand more items. Recall that J¯p is the set of items that are not matched
in M(G¯p) and N(J¯p) is the set of buyers that are connected to an item in J¯p in M(G¯p). If the
sum of the budgets of buyers in (Yt ∩Q
p) \ Iˆ is relatively small, then the algorithm “ignores”
them (i.e. does not allocate them any item) but allocates items to buyers in Yt ∩N(J
p) at p+ ǫ
6 Precisely, following the pricing scheme definitions introduced in [14], the adopted pricing scheme is a (h, p)-
proportional pricing scheme. It means that we impose an upper bound on the size of the bundles that the buyers
may request.
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Algorithm 4 An ascending price algorithm for matching markets when vi > bi
Input: < I, J,S,v,b >
Output: 〈X,p〉
1: p← 0; /*p is the price per-item and it is dynamically increasing*/
2: Gp = (Ip ∪ J,Ep); /*Gp is the preference-graph for unsold items at price p */
3: while |M(Gp)| 6= ∅ do
4: Increase p until |M(Gp)| > |M(Gp+ǫ)|;
5: Partition (N(J¯p)∪Qp) into sets of buyers Y1, . . . , Yk, where for any Yt and Yt′ there do not exist buyers y ∈ Yt
and y′ ∈ Yt′ such that Sy ∩ Sy′ 6= ∅;
6: for each Yt do
7: if
∑
i∈(Yt∩Qp)\Iˆ
bi <
∑
i∈Yt∩N(J¯p)
bi then
8: M←Compute-Allocation-II(Yt, J,S,v,b, p+ ǫ);
9: for each edge (i, j) ∈ M do
10: Iˆ = Iˆ ∪ {i}, J = J \ {j}, Xi = Xi ∪ {j}, pi = pi + p, bi = bi − p;
11: end for
12: else
13: if ∃ a matching M s.t. every buyer in Yt \ Iˆ is matched to one item then
14: Compute such a matching M;
15: else
16: M ←Compute-Allocation-II(Yt, J,S,v,b, p+ ǫ);
17: end if
18: for each edge (i, j) ∈ M do
19: Iˆ = Iˆ ∪ {i}, J = J \ {j}, Xi = Xi ∪ {j}, pi = pi + p, bi = bi − p;
20: end for
21: end if
22: end for
23: end while
each. It can be achieved by the same as Procedure Compute-Allocation-II. It would extract
at least half of the budgets of buyers in Yt ∩N(J
p), which in turn is a good approximation to
the optimal revenue from all buyers in Yt \ Iˆ.
– On the other case, when the sum of the budgets of buyers in (Yt ∩Q
p) \ Iˆ is relatively large, the
algorithm checks if it is possible to give one item to every buyer in Yt \ Iˆ. If yes, the algorithm
allocates one item to each of them. By doing so, the algorithm extracts all the budgets of buyers
in (Yt ∩ Q
p) \ Iˆ since their budgets are equal to the price. It gives us a good approximation
to the optimal revenue extracted from buyers in Yt. Otherwise, the algorithm “ignores” buyers
in (Yt ∩ Q
p) \ Iˆ and allocate items to buyers in Yt ∩ N(J¯
p) at price p + ǫ each. We show that
it does not hurt the revenue since the optimal envy-free algorithm cannot extract any revenue
from those buyers either.
4.2 Main result
Our main result is the following. Due to the space limit, the proofs of envy-freeness and the revenue
guarantee of Algorithm 4 are in Appendix D and E.
Theorem 4.1. Algorithm 4 is pairwise envy-free and achieves a 4−approximation to the optimal
revenue in envy-free outcomes when all buyers have budgets less than their valuations.
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A Proof of Lemma 3.3
Proof. First, we prove (i). Since |M(Gp)| > |M(Gp+ǫ)|, but |M(Gp)| = |M(G¯p)|, then the valu-
ations of all buyers in the graph Gp are greater than p + ǫ. Thus for any buyers i ∈ N(J¯p+ǫ), it
holds vi > p. Next we prove (ii). Assume by contradiction that a buyer i ∈ N(J¯
p+ǫ) gets allocated
|{(i, j) ∈ M(Gp+ǫ)}| < Di(p+ ǫ) items. Since i can afford at least one more item at p+ ǫ and i is
connected to an item j ∈ J¯p+ǫ by an augmenting path π (it is implied by the fact all items can be
sold at price p), it implies that one can match one more item in Gp+ǫ. It contradicts the fact that
M(Gp+ǫ) is a maximum matching. ⊓⊔
B Proof of Lemma 3.4
Proof. Notice the maximum B-matching on Gp matches all items in Gp. Notice also that all the
buyers in Algorithm 2 belong to Ap, thus every buyer decreases her demand at most by 1. So,
since N(J¯p+ǫ) ⊆ Ap is the set of buyers that are interested in the items J¯p+ǫ, we have that
|J¯p+ǫ| ≤ |N(J¯p+ǫ)|. ⊓⊔
C Proof of Lemma 3.5
Proof. Assume by contradiction that buyer i obtains the items in Xi at different prices. We denote
this set of prices by P . Let p¯ = min{p|p ∈ P}. Let j ∈ Xi be an item assigned to i at price p¯.
Note that Algorithm 1 assigns items to buyers in either Procedure Compute-Allocation-I or
Compute-Allocation-II. We prove that if the buyer i obtains an item at p¯, then she has to
obtain all the other items at p¯ too.
– Suppose that the item j is assigned in Compute-Allocation-I. It means that either (a) i ∈ Qp
or (b) i ∈ Ap and i is linked to some item in J¯ by an augmenting path. In case (a), vi = p¯, thus
buyer i cannot obtain any item at price p > p¯. In case (b), by Lemma 3.1, buyer i obtains Di(p¯)
items at price p¯ each, thus at any price p > p¯ she cannot afford any item.
– Suppose that the item j is assigned in Compute-Allocation-II. It means that i ∈ AP and
is linked to some item in J¯p+ǫ by an augmenting path. By Lemma 3.3, buyer i obtains Di(p¯)
items at price p¯ each. Thus at any price p > p¯, she cannot afford any item.
⊓⊔
D Envy-freeness of Algorithm 4
In this section, we show that Algorithm 4 is pairwise envy-free. First, we show that if a buyer does
not obtain any item, then every item in her preference-set is sold to another buyer at price greater
than her budget.
Lemma D.1. If buyer i does not obtain any item, i.e., Xi = ∅, then all items in Si are sold at a
price greater than bi.
Proof. Assume that an item j ∈ Si is sold at a price p ≤ bi. Let i
′ be the buyer that obtains j at
p. Since i′ obtains j at p, it implies that i′ has an augmenting path to an unmatched item j′ ∈ J¯p
in M(Gp) at p. Thus also i has an augmenting path to j′. Hence, i will be allocated to some item
as p. It reaches a contradiction. ⊓⊔
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Second, we show that if an item j ∈ Si is sold at price p, then buyer i whose budget is great
than p will obtain some other item(s) in Si at price-per-item p as well.
Lemma D.2. If an item j ∈ Si is sold at p and buyer i has positive demand at p, then i obtains
some items(s) in Si at p.
Proof. Assume by contradiction that j ∈ Si is sold to buyer i
′ at p and buyer i does not obtain
anything if she has a positive demand. Since i′ gets item j it means that i is connected through an
augmenting path to an item j′ ∈ J¯p. As j ∈ Si, it also implies that i has an augmenting path to j
′
and will obtain some items in Si in Algorithm 4. This reaches a contradiction. ⊓⊔
Finally, we show that when buyer i obtains items in Zi ⊆ Xi at price-per-item p, buyer i does
not envy the bundles allocated to other buyers at the same price.
Lemma D.3. If buyer i obtains a bundle Zi at price p then (vi − p) · |Zi| ≥ (vi − p) · |Zj | for all
j 6= i, where Zj is the set of items obtained by buyer j.
Proof. Buyer i obtains items in two situations: (a) when all buyers in Yt∩N(J¯
P ) obtain the number
of items that are equal to their demands, or (b) when all buyers in Yt obtain exactly 1 item. It is
clear that in both situations buyer i gets the best allocation among all buyers. ⊓⊔
Now we prove that Algorithm 4 is pairwise envy-free. By Lemma D.1, we know that the buyers
who do not obtain any item in Algorithm 4 will not envy anyone since all items in their preference
sets are sold at prices higher than their budgets. By Lemma D.2, if an item j ∈ Si is sold at price
p and Di(p) > 0 then buyer i gets at least one item too. Moreover, by Lemma D.3 we know that i
obtains the bundles that maximizes her utility among all the bundles allocated at p. This concludes
that the outcome in Algorithm 4 is pairwise envy-free.
E Revenue guarantee of Algorithm 4
In this section, we analyze the approximation ratio of Algorithm 4. The main result is the following.
Theorem E.1. Algorithm 4 obtains a 4-approximation with respect to the optimal revenue, i.e.
R(X,p) ≥ R
OPT
4 .
Proof. Given I ′ ⊆ I, let ROPTI′ denote the revenue extract from buyers in I
′ in the optimal outcome.
Similarly, RI′(X,p) denote the revenue extracted by our algorithm in allocation (X,p) from buyers
in I ′. Now, we partition I in three subsets of buyers according their allocations in Algorithm 4:
– I1: for each critical price p and each set of buyers Yt such that
∑
i∈(Yt∩Qp)\Iˆ
bi <
∑
i∈Yt∩N(J¯p)
bi,
all buyers in Yt ∩ (Q
p ∪N(J¯p)) \ Iˆ are added to I1.
– I2: for each critical price p and each set of buyers Yt such that
∑
i∈(Yt∩Qp)\Iˆ
bi ≥
∑
i∈Yt∩N(J¯p)
bi,
all sets of buyers Yt ∩ (Q
p ∪N(J¯p)) \ Iˆ to whom is possible to allocate 1 item each are added
to I2.
– I3: for each critical price p and each set of buyers Yt such that
∑
i∈(Yt∩Qp)\Iˆ
bi ≥
∑
i∈Yt∩N(J¯p)
bi,
all sets of buyers Yt∩ (Q
p∪N(J¯p))\ Iˆ to whom is not possible to allocate 1 item each are added
to I3.
Notice that each time we add a set of buyers in I1, I2, or I3, we do not consider buyers in Iˆ.
Thus to these sets are added only the buyers in (Qp ∪N(J¯p)) that do not allocate anything before.
So, I = I1 ∪ I2 ∪ I3 and Ii ∩ Ij = ∅ for i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, i 6= j.
Now we need to prove three auxiliary lemmata.
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Lemma E.1. ROPTI1 ≤ 2RI1(X,p) + 2R(X,p)
Proof. Denote with I>01 = {i ∈ I1|Xi 6= ∅} and I
=0
1 = {i ∈ I1|Xi = ∅}.
ROPTI1 ≤
∑
i∈I1
bi =
∑
i∈I>01
bi +
∑
i∈I=01
bi ≤ 2RI1(X,p) + 2R(X,p)
where the last inequality is because to each buyer i ∈ I>01 , Algorithm 4 sells ⌊
bi
p ⌋ items, where
pi is the price in which i is inserted in I1. Thus
∑
i∈I>01
bi ≤
∑
i∈I>01
(⌊
bi
pi
⌋
+ 1
)
· pi ≤
∑
i∈I>01
2
⌊
bi
pi
⌋
· pi = 2RI1(X,p)
since ⌊ bip ⌋ ≥ 1 for all i ∈ I
>0
1 . And
∑
i∈I=01
bi ≤ 2R(X,p) since for all buyers I
=0
1 exist a set of
buyers I ′ ⊆ I such that
∑
i∈I=01
bi ≤
∑
i∈I′ bi. ⊓⊔
Lemma E.2. ROPTI2 ≤ 2RI2(X,p)
Proof. Denote with I=12 buyers that were budget-limited when added to I2 and let I
>1
2 be the set
of buyers that were not budget-limited when added to I2.
ROPTI2 ≤
∑
i∈I2
bi =
∑
i∈I=12
bi +
∑
i∈I>12
bi ≤ 2
∑
i∈I=12
bi = 2RI2(X,p)
The second inequality is because
∑
i∈I=12
bi >
∑
i∈I>12
bi by definition of I2. ⊓⊔
Lemma E.3. ROPTI1 ≤ 2RI3(X,p)
Proof. Denote with I>03 = {i ∈ I3|Xi 6= ∅} and I
=0
3 = {i ∈ I3|Xi = ∅}. First start with the following
lemma.
Lemma E.4. All buyers in I=03 do not receive items also in the optimal envy-free solution.
Proof. Let P be the set of prices used for buyers in I3. Thus, we can partition the set I
=0
3 =⋃
p∈P I
=0
3,p .
Now, for all each p ∈ P we may have many set of buyers Yt. But, for all sets Yt and all prices
p ∈ P it is true that there is no matching such that all buyers Yt can obtain one item. Notice that
each buyer i ∈ Yt does not allocate any items at any price p
′ < p. Thus, each buyer i ∈ Yt is also
not interested in any items sold before, otherwise by Lemma D.2 i has to obtain something too.
It means that all the items desired by buyers Yt are available at p. Thus, if it is not possible
to match exactly one item to each buyer i ∈ Yt, then also the optimal envy-free solution. does not
allocate any items to buyers in Yt. Since, this is true for each p ∈ P, the lemma is proved. ⊓⊔
Thus,
ROPTI3 ≤
∑
i∈I>03
bi ≤ 2RI3(X,p)
18
where the first inequality is by Lemma E.4. Last inequality is because to all i ∈ I>03 , whatever
price p is, the algorithm sells to them ⌊ bip ⌋ items. Thus the revenue extracted from them is
∑
i∈I>03
bi ≤
∑
i∈I>03
(⌊
bi
pi
⌋
+ 1
)
· pi ≤
∑
i∈I>03
2
⌊
bi
pi
⌋
· pi ≤ 2RI3(X,p)
since ⌊ bip ⌋ ≥ 1 for all i ∈ I
>0
3 . ⊓⊔
Finally, by Lemma E.1, Lemma E.2, and Lemma E.3:
ROPT = ROPTI1 +R
OPT
I2 +R
OPT
I3
2RI1(X,p) + 2R(X,p) + 2RI2(X,p) + 2RI3(X,p) ≤ 4R(X,p)
⊓⊔
F Limits of fixed-price auctions
The first attempt to design revenue-maximizing envy-free algorithms is to consider the fixed-price
scheme which assigns a uniform price for all items. The fixed-price scheme is practical and is
commonly used in the design of revenue-maximizing envy-free algorithms (see [11,14]). Our first
result is that revenue obtained from the fixed-price scheme cannot approximate the optimal revenue
within a factor of O(log n).
Theorem F.1. The optimal revenue of envy-free outcome in matching markets cannot be approx-
imated within O(log n) by any fixed-price scheme.
Proof. Consider an instance with an equal numbers of buyers and items. More specifically, let
I = {1, . . . , n} and J = {j1, . . . , jn}. For each buyer i ∈ I, let Si = {ji}, and vi = bi =
n
n−i+1 .
As there is no intersection between the preference sets of buyers, the optimal envy-free outcome
allocates Si to buyer i and charges buyer i at price
n
n−i+1 . Thus, R
OPT =
∑n
i=1
n
n−i+1 . Note that
any fixed-price scheme decides an uniform price for all items. As the valuation and budgets are
monotonic among all buyers, it implies that, when price p is greater than vi, only buyers with k > i
are allocated the items in their preference sets. It is easy to verify that the optimal revenue in the
fixed-price scheme is n by setting the uniform price equal to an arbitrary vi. Hence,
R
ROPT
=
vi · (n− i+ 1)∑n
i=1 vi
=
n∑n
i=1
n
n−(i−1)
≤
n
n · log n
=
1
log n
⊓⊔
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